Apollo experience report:  The role of flight mission rules in mission preparation and conduct by Keyser, L. W.










APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - 
THE ROLE OF FLIGHT MISSION RULES 
IN MISSION PREPARATION AND CONDUCT 
by L d r y  W. Kyser 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houstor-2, Texas 77058 
N A T I O N A L  AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. NOVEMBER 1974 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19750002893 2020-03-23T03:36:29+00:00Z
1 .  Re r t  No. 2. Government Accession No. 
NrSA TN D-7822 
3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C. 20546 
1. Title and Subtitle 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
THE ROLE OF FLIGHT MISSION RULES 
IN MISSION PREPARATION AND CONDUCT 
7. Authorb) 
Larry W. Keyser 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
2 .  Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code I 
5. Report Date 
November 1974 
6. Performing Organization Code 
8. Performing Organization Report No. 
JSC S-417 
10. Work Unit No. 
640-89-00-00-72 
11. Contract or Grant No. 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
Technical Note 
5. Supplementary Notes 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 
Unc la s sif i ed 
20. Security Classif. (of  this page) 
Unclassified 
6. Abstract 
This report  describes the development of flight mission rules from the mission development 
phase through the detailed mission-planning phase and through the testing and training phase. 
The procedure for review of the rules and the coordination requirements for mission-rule 
development a r e  presented. The application of the rules to real-time decisionmaking is 
outlined, and consideration is given to the benefit of training ground controllers and 
flightcrews in the methods of determining the best response to a nonnominal in-flight 
situation for which no action has been preplanned. The Flight Mission Rules document is 
discussed i n  t e rms  of the purpose and objective thereof and in  te rms  of the definition, the 
development, and the use of mission rules. 
21. NO. of Pages 22. Price 
10 $3.00 
7. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement 
' Flight Rules 
' Mission Operations 
* Mission Planning 
STAR Subject Category: 31 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
THE ROLE OF FLIGHT M I S S I O N  RULES 
I N  M I S S I O N  PREPARATION AND CONDUCT 
B y  L a r r y  W .  Keyser 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The premission preparation of flight mission rules delineates responsibility and 
authority for the operational conduct of a mission. Because mission success and crew 
safety often a r e  dependent on clear instructions and precise actions, the questions of 
who has the authority to act and what the action is to be must be reso€ved before the 
mission, whenever possible. The lack of immediate action, when required, because of 
undefined responsibilities o r  authority, can be just as disastrous as the wrong action. 
The effect of flight mission rules was  to enable prompt and accurate preplanned action 
to be taken for 80 percent of the in-flight failures that occurred during the Apollo 
Program. 
Premission coordination of mission rules helps management to observe the 
development of the planned execution of the mission and to  monitor the methods of 
operation from mission to mission to ensure continuity of operational philosophy 
between missions. The documentation of responses (as many as are practical) to 
abnormal in-flight situations is a good operational practice because it forces the entire 
mission-planning team to coordinate the various efforts. Premission coordination of 
mission rules  also facilitates the training of ground controllers and flightcrews in  the 
methods of determining the best response to a nonnominal in-flight situation for which 
an action has not been preplanned. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
Flight controllers accomplished the operational execution of the flight phase of 
the Apollo Program. The most important task of flight control was being prepared to 
make correct  real-time decisions consistent with crew safety, mission-objective 
priorit ies , and mission-operations/ hardware-performance constraints. Sometimes 
these decisions were made in time-critical situations in  which there was no time to 
review possible actions - only time to respond. The action based on these decisions 
ranged f rom a spacecraft switch reconfiguration o r  a small  change in  the Flight Plan 
to an immediate termination of the mission. 
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A fundamental approach to the successful conduct of a mission in  any flight-test 
program is to be prepared for  the loss  of significant spacecraft functions and to have 
alternate courses of action preplanned where’ possible. The flight mission rules were 
developed before a mission to arr ive at the appropriate corrective actions for potential 
losses of functions or  capabilities. 
The primary objective of flight mission rules w a s  to provide guidelines for 
flight-control and flightcrew personnel to use to expedite the decisionmaking process. 
These guidelines were based on detailed knowledge of and experience with space vehicle 
systems, mission-equipment configuration for support of spacecraft systems, con- 
straints,  flightcrew procedures, and mission objectives. All these a reas  were 
reviewed in  detail and were formulated into a ser ies  of basic ground rules to increase 
flightcrew safety and to optimize the chances of completing the mission objectives; 
flightcrew safety, however, w a s  the overriding factor for all decisions. These 
decisions or rules were published and distributed to all operational elements. 
The Flight Mission Rules Document (FMRD) was the controlled publication that 
contained the operational policy necessary for the effective control of a mission. 
Through a review of the FMRD, the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) and 
other management groups had the opportunity to approve the operational policies for 
each mission. Such a controlled document allowed preplanned courses of action to be 
systematically reviewed by the appropriate levels within NASA or  to be coordinated 
throughout various intracenter and intercenter organizations and the respective 
contractors . 
DEFINITION OF M I S S I O N  RULES 
Flight mission rules a r e  agreements among NASA management, flightcrew 
personnel, flight operations personnel, personnel from the various program offices, 
and associated space-vehicle contractors and manufacturers on courses of action to 
take in  nonnominal in-flight situations. The NASA Headquarters specified the require- 
ment for mission rules in  a program directive to all organizations that conducted or 
supported Apollo mission operations. This directive contained the general contents 
and description of the FMRD and established the responsibilities for the preparation, 
coordination, and review of the rules.  The mission rules included the following. 
1. Nominal and nonnominal performance cr i ter ia  for space vehicle systems and 
subsystems 
2. Trajectory and guidance guidelines 
3.  Flight-abort cri teria 
4. Criteria for the real-time selection of alternate missions 
5. Mandatory and highly desirable support requirements of the Mission Control 
Center (MCC), the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN), and the Marshall 
Space Flight Center for real-time flight operations and for subsequent analysis and 
ev d u a t  i on 
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6. Rules about human,or medical aspects of manned flight 
7. Mission GO/NO-GO criteria based on systems and medical considerations 
8 .  Criteria for extravehicular activity and for deployment of the scientific 
Apollo lunar surface experiments package 
9. Recovery restrictions 
10. Launch-window rules on time of lift-off, launch azimuth, recovery, and 
spacecraft perf o r  manc e limitations 
Basically, mission rules were composed of three different types: general rules,  
flight operations rules,  and specific rules. General rules were furnished by the Office 
of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) to set forth the policy for preparation, coordination, 
and review of the rules. Flight operations rules, which are guidelines for  the creation 
of the specific rules,  a r e  furnished by the Director of Flight Operations and by the 
Flight Director and his staff to provide direction and policy on a detailed, mission- 
specific level and to reflect the position of the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) on 
the conduct of the mission. The specific rules, remedial courses of action to be fol- 
lowed in  specific contingency situations, a r e  compiled by the individual flight control- 
l e rs ,  after coordinating data from cognizant personnel according to the general 
guidelines set  forth by the OMSF and the FOD, to cover the failures of space- 
craft and ground systems. 
Mission rules also include GO/NO-GO points, which a r e  points in the mission 
when the decision is made to commit or not to commit the space vehicle and crew to 
the next, usually more critical, mission phase. A GO decision is made after the 
status of the space vehicle and crew has been assessed; it is a statement of confidence 
in  the space vehicle and crew to proceed successfully, to complete, o r  to return 
safely from the next mission phase. If a NO-GO decision is reached, the next mission 
phase is not entered and an alternate mission or mission termination results. These 
GO/NO-GO decision points a r e  defined by the mission design and by the initiation 
of a specific o r  unique phase or  event. The GO cr i ter ia  for the spacecraft systems a r e  
summarized in  charts by mission phase. The capabilities listed in  these charts a r e  
the requirements for initiation or continuation of a mission phase or event. 
THE ROLE OF M I S S I O N  RULES DURING M I S S I O N  PREPARATION 
Operational preparation for a mission begins with the spacecraft design and the 
initial commitment to the construction of flight vehicles and launch facilities. The 
development of mission operations begins after sufficient information on space vehicle 
design is available. During the Apollo Program, mission preparation was divided into 
three separate phases: the mission development phase, the detailed planning phase, 
and the testing and training phase. These phases and an example of mission-rule 
development a r e  discussed in  the following paragraphs. 
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M i s s i o n  Development Phase 
The mission development phase began approximately 2 years  before the first 
launch of a new flight program. The conceptual guidelines for conducting operational 
support of the flight were established at the beginning of this phase. Initial program 
direction began with the mission definition as outlined in  the Mission Requirements 
Document. A s  the mission became better defined, personnel had an opportunity to 
analyze the possible effect of various onboard and ground systems failure modes on the 
mission and to identify additional systems changes and requirements. These analyses 
lead to the identification of certain guidelines and constraints. These guidelines and 
constraints were then used as criteria for continuing beyond certain points in  the 
mission and subsequently became the GO/ NO- GO cr i ter ia  for the mission rules. When 
a constraint o r  guideline could not be satisfied by a change in  the mission design, a 
mission rule was written to ensure that the constraint o r  guideline would not be vio- 
lated. In some cases,  the mission profile o r  spacecraft-system operation had to be 
changed when a rule could not be written to satisfy existing constraints. 
For  Apollo, the OMSF rules were used during this phase as basic guidelines for  
the development of the flight operations rules. Flight operations rules were affected 
most during this phase. As the mission became more defined, the various constraints 
and guidelines that were generated often required the addition o r  modification of a 
rule. The analyses of these constraints and guidelines, the mission profile, and the 
mission rules frequently necessitated recommendations to change either ground- 
based o r  space vehicle hardware and software. 
Detailed P l a n n i n g  Phase 
The detailed planning phase for a particular Apollo mission began when the 
detailed mission objectives were assigned (approximately 6 months before the launch). 
The detailed objectives were assigned priorit ies and integrated into the mission time 
line. This procedure was  affected by the mission rules  i f  any of the time-line changes, 
systems constraints, o r  operating limits caused a mission rule to be violated. Con- 
versely, if  certain objectives were to be achieved, other mission rules had to be 
written to ensure safe conduct of the mission. 
The beginning of the detailed planning phase was characterized by the initial 
formulation of the specific rules, which were developed to be compatible with other 
documentation being produced during this phase. These documents included the 
Spacecraft Operational Data Book (SODB) and other documents relating to trajectory, 
time lines, and procedures. The specific rules  for each specialty a rea  were formu- 
lated by the appropriate flight-operations, launch-vehicle, experiment, scientific, 
medical, recovery, and space-radiation personnel. These rules  were based on exist- 
ing capabilities, requirements, limitations, mission objectives and mission applica- 
bility wherein flight crew safety was the overriding factor.  The data used for writ- 
ing the specific rules were derived from flight-test experience, ground-test experi- 
ence, engineering simulations, training experience, space vehicle and crew-equipment 
design specifications, and the flight operations rules.  
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Onboard and ground-control procedures were developed during this phase in  
parallel with the mission rules. To aid the development of onboard procedures, the 
flightcrew was kept apprised of mission rules; to keep the mission rules current, the 
flight controllers were advised of the latest crew procedures. The rules and proce- 
dures had to be compatible to ensure the proper use of spacecraft systems. Ground- 
control procedures for flight controllers were developed similarly, in parallel with the 
mission rules. Constant coordination between the flightcrew and the flight controllers 
was required to keep each group apprised of the current thinking on the various rules 
and procedures. 
Testing and T ra in ing  .Phase 
An Apollo mission testing-and-training phase began approximately 90 days before 
lift-off; at this time, operational testing of the rules was performed in a simulated 
environment. The flight-control and flightcrew personnel exercised the rules during 
integrated simulations; the rules were changed when, as a result of simulations, it 
was determined that a rule was wrong o r  that a new rule was required. Frequently, 
simulations resulted in  the discovery that a rule could not be implemented because of 
a lack of time o r  because of inadequate data. In such cases,  the rules were modified 
to compensate for the delays in  data processing o r  the lack of data. The flightcrew 
and flight-control procedures were also refined during this phase as the rules were 
exercised. 
A s  the rules changed, the procedures were changed to make them compatible 
with the rules;  in  instances when rules were not changed, the procedures were altered 
to prevent violation of any rules, guidelines, o r  constraints. 
The rules were reviewed throughout the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)) by personnel in  each specialty 
area and were later reviewed in  a NASA-wide review to ensure compatibility among 
operational elements. These reviews were conducted by the Flight Director in con- 
junction with the ASPO, the flightcrew, the contractors (as required), the safety 
office, other mission- support personnel, and the flight controllers from the systems 
specialty areas.  
The rules were influenced at these reviews by any new developments or  failures- 
effects analyses, test-vehicle reports, simulation evaluations, manufacturer reports,  
and pad-test results. The SODB and other documentation were updated as the rules 
were changed as a consequence of these reviews. The simulation-review-rewrite- 
simulation iterative cycle during this phase continued until lift-off and provided the 
rules  their  finest critique. 
Example of Miss ion-Ru le  Development 
A good example of the development of a mission rule involves communications 
with the lunar module (LM) during descent to, and ascent from, the lunar surface during 
the Apollo 11 mission. After ASPO had outlined the attitude guidelines for the first 
5 
lunar-landing mission, the mission planners constructed an attitude time line. This 
time line revealed that during lunar descent and ascent, for landing s i tes  outside 
rf: 20" longitude, the STDN would lose telemetry and tracking coverage of the LM 
between an altitude of 50 000 and 20 000 feet. 
The LM contractors proposed several hardware, software, and procedural 
changes to the ASPO. One proposed change was to maneuver the spacecraft attitude 
between 50 000 and 20 000 feet  altitude to provide good communications through better 
antenna pointing. The ASPO decided not to change the LM hardware or software design 
because of weight, schedule, and cost factors.  The flightcrew concurred with the 
ASPO on no spacecraft changes but also went on record as not favoring an attitude 
constraint, at least not that long before mission simulations could validate the con- 
straint. The flightcrew believed that "voice only'' communications between 50 000 and 
20 000 feet altitude were satisfactory for crew safety. 
Flight controllers examined the effect that the loss  of this telemetry and tracking 
data would have on crew safety and on mission success; they concluded that i t  was 
mandatory to keep all communications. The flight controllers agreed with the flight- 
crew and with the ASPO on no spacecraft modifications but believed that an attitude 
constraint was best and should be planned because i t  might be required. 
The flight controllers then submitted their operational constraints to the mission 
planners; these constraints stated that constant telemetry and tracking coverage were 
required for the entire descent and ascent phases. The mission planners then 
examined different attitude profiles for these phases and determined the proper attitude 
for  good, continuous communications at different landing sites.  
When the flight controllers wrote the preliminary mission rules for these 
phases, telemetry and tracking were required to begin and to continue through descent. 
After the ramifications of various LM failures without communications were discussed 
with everyone involved, the crewmembers agreed to perform an attitude maneuver to 
keep continuous communications during ascent or descent, if necessary. The simula- 
tions provided a realistic impression of the ascent and descent phases of the mission, 
and a decision w a s  made that constant telemetry and tracking were not absolutely 
required; however, ground-based personnel did require adequate data to make each 
GO/ NO-GO decision to continue powered descent. The mission rule concerning loss  
of LM telemetry for the Apollo 11 mission is given in  figure 1. 
THE ROLE OF MISSION RULES I N  FLIGHT 
The in-flight application of the mission rules  to nonnominal situations actually 
began before lift-off. Some of the rules applied to failures during the prelaunch count- 
down of space vehicle instrumentation that might be required for mahing GO/NO-GO 
decisions later in the mission. Other rules applied to the MCC capability to support 
the mission. Consumables-loading redlines were also exercised during the prelaunch 
period. Failures of flight instrumentation o r  ground-support equipment during the 
countdown could have caused a hold or a scrub of the launch. Al l  the failures or  
anomalies that could have possibly caused a hold or a scrub should have been docu- 
mented in the FMRD. 
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Figure 1. - Mission rules 20-55 and 20-56 for the Apollo 11 mission. 
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Any decision involving these failures or anomalies was preplanned and automatic; i f  
these failures o r  anomalies had not been documented, a decision, based on the philos- 
ophy used to develop the rules that were documented, was  made at that time. After 
lift-off, the instrumentation and ground-support rules no longer applied. 
Throughout the Apollo Program, approximately 80 percent of all problems 
encountered in flight, both large and small, had been analyzed previously and a course 
of action documented before the flight. This analysis allowed the choice of a best 
course of action subsequent to most failures to be essentially automatic. The remain- 
ing 20 percent of the problems were solved readily in flight by using the same deci- 
sionmaking logic used to develop mission rules before the mission; this procedure, 
however, is not as desirable as having mission rules available, because little or  no 
time exists for a review-simulation-rewrite cycle to validate the rule and the proce- 
dures involved. 
The implementation of a mission rule begins with the recognition of an abnormal 
condition by the flightcrew or  by the flight-control team. Once identified, i f  the 
failure is time critical and catastrophic, an immediate flight abort is required; if time 
allows and i f  the failure is not catastrophic, a search is made to isolate the problem 
source. This is accomplished by flightcrew observations during the execution of 
systems malfunction procedures, by flight-control real-time observations of the mal- 
function procedures, by analyses of taped records of telemetry and voice playbacks, 
by trend analyses, by analyses of premission testing and data, and by a comparison of 
previous-mission data. If the identification of the problem source reveals an impend- 
ing catastrophic failure, an attempt is made to circumvent the problem by procedural 
changes i n  the use of the systems. An immediate termination of the flight may be 
required if the failure is still imminent. If the failure is not imminent, continuation 
of the remainder of the flight depends on the number of mission objectives remaining 
to be accomplished. The mission rules,  the nominal Flight Plan, and any preplanned 
alternate mission plans must be examined to determine an acceptable course of action 
for  the accomplishment of the mission objectives, with crew safety kept as the para- 
mount issue. In some cases,  after this examination, the scheduled nominal mission is 
permitted to continue; in  other cases,  an alternate mission is chosen. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The flight mission rules proved to be a very effective tool in  planning and 
executing Apollo missions in  a safe manner. The rules  enabled prompt and accurate 
preplanned action to be taken for approximately 80 percent of the in-flight failures 
that occurred. The experience gained in  developing these rules enabled the ground and 
flight personnel to determine rapidly and effectively corrective actions for the remain- 
der of the failures. 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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